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Food-for-work for Poverty Reduction and the 
Promotion of Sustainable Land Use: Can It Work? 
 
 
Abstract  
Food-for-work (FFW) programs are commonly used both for short-term relief and 
long-term development purposes. In this paper we assess the potential of FFW 
programs to reduce poverty and promote sustainable land use in the longer run. 
There is a danger that such programs distort labor allocation or crowd out private 
investments and therefore have negative side effects. How important are such effects, 
when are these effects small and large, and when and how can they be reduced? How 
do technology and market characteristic and the design of FFW programs affect the 
long-run impact of FFW interventions? When, where and how can FFW programs 
more efficiently reduce poverty and promote more sustainable land management? 
Could FFW programs even be used to crowd in private investments? The paper 
attempts to provide answers to these questions, drawing on empirical evidence and an 
applied bio-economic farm household model for a less-favoured area in northern 
Ethiopia.  
 
 
Summary  
Recent research on food-for-work (FFW) programs has focused on the short-term 
impacts in terms of poverty targeting efficacy and protection against shocks. While 
these issues are important, there has been a tendency to neglect the more long-term 
effects of FFW in terms of poverty reduction, growth enhancement and natural 
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resource conservation. Most hunger in the world is due to chronic deprivation and 
vulnerability, not short-term shocks. Furthermore, many FFW programs have explicit 
long-term objectives as primary or equally important objectives. On this basis this 
paper assesses the potential of FFW to contribute to poverty reduction and natural 
resource conservation in the longer run. We do this through analysis of survey 
evidence from northern Ethiopia that we use to motivate a simple theoretical model, a 
less general and more detailed version of which we then implement through an 
applied bio-economic model calibrated to northern Ethiopia.  The analysis explores 
how FFW project outcomes may depend on FFW project design, market and 
technology characteristics. We show that FFW programs may crowd out or crowd in 
private investments and highlight factors that may pull in different directions.  
 
Our empirical evidence from northern Ethiopia shows that time constraints and food 
supplied through FFW may crowd out other activities and own food production. 
However, we also found that FFW projects could crowd in private investment in soil 
and water conservation by providing technical support, mobilizing local labor, 
coordinating activities across farms, resolving resource conflicts and possibly 
providing insurance and reducing personal discount rates.  
 
We then illustrate the possible crowding out effects through a simple static household 
model with imperfect markets. The dynamic extension of the model illustrates the 
possible crowding in effects through investment-stock effects related to the natural 
resources and human resources of households.  
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Finally, we illustrate the inherent ambiguity of FFW projects’ effects on long-term 
productivity and natural resource conservation through a bio-economic household 
model applied to an area in northern Ethiopia. This dynamic, non-linear, non-
separable household model simultaneously integrates economic optimization in 
production and consumption with intertemporal environmental feedbacks. Different 
scenarios are compared. First, FFW employment directed outside agriculture can be 
compared against FFW applied within agriculture in form of investment in land 
conservation. We show how assumptions about access to alternative off-farm 
employment (i.e., the opportunity cost of farmers’ time) and the short-term impacts of 
conservation technologies on farm productivity affect outcomes of FFW 
interventions. The simulations show that FFW targeted outside agriculture may 
reduce incentives for agricultural production and land conservation and therefore have 
negative crowding out effects. However, if FFW is targeted at investment in land 
conservation, FFW may enhance agricultural production in the longer run and lead to 
more sustainable production. The conservation effects of FFW may be higher when 
the private incentives for conservation are lower.  
 
We conclude that FFW projects have the potential of contributing to long-term 
development in economies characterized by imperfect markets but poor design and 
implementation can easily lead to the opposite result. It is a skill and knowledge-
demanding task to design and implement efficient FFW program and a lot of room for 
improvement of existing programs. 
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I. Introduction 
Food-for-work (FFW) programs are commonly used both for short-term relief and 
long-term development purposes.  In the latter capacity, they are increasingly used for 
natural resources management projects. In this paper we explore the question of FFW 
programs’ potential to reduce poverty and promote sustainable land use in the longer 
run through induced changes in investment patterns.  
 
FFW programs commonly aim to produce or maintain potentially valuable public 
goods necessary to stimulate productivity and thus income growth.  Among the most 
common projects are road building, reforestation, and the installation of soil 
conservation measures or irrigation.  In the abstract, public goods such as these are 
unambiguously good.  There is a danger, however, that such programs could 
discourage private soil and water conservation and crowd out private investment. 
How important are such effects, when are these effects small or large, and when and 
how can they be reduced? How do market characteristics and the timing and design of 
FFW programs affect long-term productivity impacts of FFW programs? When, 
where and how can FFW programs more efficiently reduce poverty and promote more 
sustainable land management? The paper aims to answer these questions. 
 
Much recent empirical research has focused on the shorter-term issue of whether FFW 
and related workfare programs efficiently target the poor (Dev 1995, von Braun 1995, 
Webb 1995, Subbarao 1997, Clay et al. 1999, Devereux 1999, Jayne et al. 1999, 
Ravallion 1999, Teklu and Asefa 1999, Atwood et al. 2000, Gebremedhin and 
Swinton 2000, Haddad and Adato 2001, Jalan and Ravallion 2001).  Much less 
research has been focused on the longer-term effects of FFW. Yet the large share of 
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hunger worldwide arises due to chronic deprivation and vulnerability, not short-term 
shocks (Speth, 1993, Barrett, 2002). Also, many FFW programs around the world 
have explicit long-term objectives that are at least as important to the program 
managers and participants as short-term transfer objectives.  For example, most of the 
FFW programs in Ethiopia have long-term development goals and are formally 
distinguished from the disaster relief FFW programs1 (Aas and Mellemstrand, 2002). 
In a case study in Tigray, Aas and Mellemstrand (2002) found that the FFW recipients 
considered the long-term benefits of FFW as more important than the short-term 
benefits of food provision.  It is therefore appropriate to evaluate these programs 
based on their long-term goals and not only on the basis of short-term targeting 
efficacy. 
 
FFW programs may produce valuable public goods. For example, von Braun et al. 
(1999) report multiplier effects of a FFW-built road in the Ethiopian lowlands.  Public 
provision of public goods related to the natural environment may be socially desirable 
because private investment in soil and water conservation and tree planting may be 
well below socially optimal levels due to poverty and market imperfections (Holden 
et al., 1998, Holden and Shiferaw, 2002, Holden and Yohannes, 2002, Pender and 
Kerr, 1998), tenure insecurity (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000, Holden et al., 2003), 
or lack of technical knowledge and coordination problems across farms (Hagos and 
Holden, 2002). There is, however, also a danger that FFW programs crowd out 
private investments (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000).  
 
                                                 
1 Actually, only programs with long-term development objective are called FFW programs in Ethiopia, 
while programs with short-term relief as primary objective are called Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(EGS) programs. 
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We study the long-term effects of FFW programs on agricultural productivity, 
resource conditions and the incomes of poor households using multiple methods. 
First, in section II we discuss FFW programs in general and present some empirical 
evidence from northern Ethiopia on the use of FFW for long-term investments, 
especially soil and water conservation structures. Section III introduces a simple 
theoretical framework for understanding the analytically ambiguous effects of FFW 
programs on the sustainability of land use patterns and the incomes of program 
participants.  We first present the basic intuition in a static framework to illustrate the 
selection, crowding out and targeting issues, before generalizing it to a dynamic 
model to illustrate the possible insurance and crowding in effects of FFW.  Section IV 
then uses a less general, applied, dynamic bio-economic farm household model 
applied to a less-favoured area in northern Ethiopia to investigate via numerical 
simulation how household welfare and land use patterns vary with changes in 
environmental and FFW program design parameters. Section V discusses our findings 
and fleshes them out a bit with further empirical evidence.  Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Food-for-work programs   
a. General background on food-for-work 
FFW has become increasingly popular over the past decade, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Devereux 1999, von Braun et al. 1999).  FFW programs typically aim 
(i) to provide participants with at least the minimum essential quantity of food 
necessary to maintain good nutrition, (ii) to require work in exchange for this benefit, 
(iii) to reduce or decentralize both the targeting of beneficiaries and the prioritisation 
and management of public works projects, and (iv) to harness the few resources 
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available, whatever the form in which they are available (e.g., food), to try to advance 
long-term development objectives in food-deficit areas.   
 
The long-term development objectives of FFW programs can be realized through 
either of three distinct channels.  First, well-run FFW programs provide insurance 
against transitory income shocks, effectively guarantee of a minimum income to all 
who are willing to work. This puts a floor beneath labor productivity and income, 
keeping people from suffering excessively in the wake of temporary shocks and from 
employing labor excessively in activities that may have long-run costs (e.g., soil 
nutrient mining, over harvesting wildlife, excessive forest clearing, prostitution, etc.).2  
The insurance function of food-based safety nets can both preserve valuable human 
capital in the face of income shocks and, by reducing downside risk exposure, 
encourage greater asset accumulation, adoption of improved technologies and natural 
resources management practices and other higher risk-higher return activities.  
 
Second, FFW represents a transfer and, as such, can relieve seasonal liquidity 
constraints that might limit farmer purchase of valuable inputs and investment in 
productivity enhancements, such as soil and water conservation structures.  There is 
some evidence from Kenya (Bezuneh et al., 1988, Barrett et al., 2001) that well-
targeted and well-timed FFW initiatives have proved successful in relaxing poor 
farmers’ short-term liquidity constraints, thereby enabling them to increase their 
medium-to-long-run productivity through purchases of improved seeds and inorganic 
fertilizer, reduced distress sales of valuable livestock and machinery, and keeping 
children in school. 
                                                 
2 See Barrett and Arcese (1998) or Barrett (1999) for examples of the connection between stochastic 
labor productivity and environmental degradation and the prospective role for labor-based safety nets.  
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Third, FFW programs can create new, valuable public goods, such as roads, irrigation 
and soil and water conservation structures to reduce erosion and improve agricultural 
productivity.   These public goods can increase future productivity, especially if their 
provision helps induce private capital accumulation as well because the returns to 
private investment depend in part on complementary investments by others, as is 
commonly the case in natural resources management (e.g., weed control, pest control, 
erosion control through terracing, etc.) due to coordination problems (Barrett, 2003, 
Hogset 2003).   
 
Of course, because FFW is not a lump sum transfer, it necessarily has distortionary 
effects as well, especially with respect to labor allocation.  If the public goods created 
by FFW programs are of low quality or prove unsustainable and FFW diverts 
resources away from productive private activities, it can undermine long-term 
productivity and resource sustainability.   It remains an open question how these 
effects net out and the conditions under which one might reasonably expect FFW 
programs to prove stimulative or counterproductive. While much of the research on 
FFW has focused on the short-term effects associated with targeting efficacy, in this 
paper we are more interested in the longer-term effects on the natural resource base 
and farmer productivity and poverty.  
 
b. Evidence from northern Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world and the Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia is one of Ethiopia’s poorest. Erratic rainfall, land degradation and high 
population density cause the livelihoods of millions of people who depend heavily on 
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semi-subsistence agricultural production to be threatened both in the short and the 
longer run. Policy failures and wars have further contributed to a neo-Malthusian 
development path of deepening poverty and natural resource degradation, although 
there have been signs of more positive development over the last ten years. This may 
be due to a more market friendly approach combined with strong government support 
and local collective action to rehabilitate local livelihoods. Still, food security is 
threatened by frequent droughts and the majority of the population is net buyers of 
food who regularly receive food aid. Most of this food aid has been distributed 
through FFW programs.  If FFW can not only help prevent under nutrition but also 
help reduce natural resources degradation associated with soil erosion and nutrient 
depletion in hilly, rain fed agriculture, it could have quite a salutary effect on poor 
Tigrayan farmers. 
 
We motivate the theoretical and simulation work of subsequent sections by 
illustrating a few basic patterns from survey data covering 400 households in 16 
communities in the highlands of Tigray. The sub-sample of 16 communities was 
strategically chosen to include four communities from each of the four zones in 
Tigray, to have eight communities with high population density and eight with low 
population density, to have eight with good market access and eight with poor market 
access, and to include three communities with irrigation projects.  The households 
were surveyed in both 1998 and 2001. We have complete data for both years for 323 
households. 
 
The government of Ethiopia has a policy of committing 80 percent of food aid 
resources to FFW programs, although in practice this varies considerably, particularly 
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in emergencies and in pastoral areas (Sandford and Habtu, 2000). FFW has been 
especially widespread in northern Ethiopia as the government has tried to improve 
food security and promote sustainable development in a chronically poor and food 
insecure region. Fifty-seven percent of our sample households participated in FFW 
projects, supplying an average of 45 labor man-days in 2000, with greater 
participation in remote areas with poor market access. 
 
Crowding out or crowding in effects of FFW? 
In the first round survey in 1998, 21% of the households stated that FFW participation 
gave them less time to look after their farm and animals, while only one percent stated 
that it gave them more time to look after their farm and animals (Hagos and Holden, 
1998).  Furthermore, 43% stated that FFW reduced their need to produce own food, 
while only four percent stated that it made them able to invest more on their own 
farms.  This suggests that FFW may indeed have some crowding-out effects on farm 
labor and production.  On the other hand, the insurance function played by FFW may 
reduce the subjective discount rates and increase the planning horizon of poor people 
(Holden et al., 1998; Holden and Shiferaw, 2002).   Lower discount rates and longer 
planning horizons increase the attractiveness of investment relative to current 
consumption and would thereby be expected to have the opposite, crowding-in effect 
on private on-farm investment, including in soil conservation. 
 
Table 1 enumerates the various FFW activities in which sample households 
participated. As can be seen, much FFW activity in Tigray has focused on soil and 
water conservation. Initially, much of these activities were carried out on communal 
land.  In the second half of the 1990s these activities also expanded into the private 
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land holdings. These investments were also complemented by mass mobilization of 
labor at community level. Mass mobilization has been an annual activity in Tigray for 
many years. Each able-bodied adult person has to contribute 20 days of work to the 
community without any direct payment. This may be seen as a publicly organized 
collective action or a uniform labor tax that is invested within the local community, 
which also decides on where to allocate the mobilized labor. Table 2 presents the 
types of activities households participated in through mass mobilization in 1997. 
 
The survey also asked households what assistance they considered important in order 
to be able to reduce land degradation in their area. Their responses are summarized in 
Table 3.  Respondents universally considered technical assistance most important, 
although many emphasized the importance of labor mobilization and conflict 
resolution as well. There is clearly a need to coordinate conservation activities across 
farms and considerable technical skills are required to design and fit the alternative 
conservation technologies into the landscape.  Given the spatial externalities 
associated with soil and water conservation structures among contiguous farms, there 
may be natural disincentives to undertake private, uncoordinated investment in land 
improvements that will benefit one’s neighbors or that may prove unproductive in the 
absence of complementary investments by neighbors upslope.  This adds an additional 
rationale for public intervention to promote land conservation on private land. FFW 
may in this connection also be beneficial as a complementary instrument to mass 
mobilization to increase investment on privately operated land. The result may be 
crowding in rather than crowding out of private investment due to the demonstration, 
coordination, labor mobilization, insurance and conflict resolution effects. 
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How are public and private investments distributed across farm plots? Table 4 
presents the distribution of public and private investment in soil bunds and stone 
terraces at farm plot level.  Roughly half of the plots with privately-built stone 
terraces also had public conservation investment, while only about one-quarter of the 
plots on which there had been public conservation investments had privately-built 
stone terraces.  These patterns were roughly similar for soil bunds. These data provide 
an uncommon opportunity to analyze the determinants of private investment in 
conservation at plot level, in particular the effect of public conservation investments 
through FFW and other labor mobilization schemes on private soil conservation 
investments (Hagos and Holden, 2003).      
 
Hagos and Holden (2003) found that public investment at plot level was positively 
correlated with private investment in conservation through both soil bunds and stone 
terraces. Such positive correlation was found both for the probability of private plot 
level conservation and the intensity of plot level private conservation investment. In 
that analysis, we controlled for a large number of soils and plot characteristics, 
household characteristics, village and market characteristics. This seems strong 
evidence that public conservation investments can indeed crowd in private investment 
in soil and water conservation.  This beneficial effect seems to have multiple sources 
– the need for technical support (demonstration effect), coordination across farms, 
labor mobilization, insurance and conflict resolution – although the data do not permit 
us to distinguish between these cleanly.  The combination of FFW and mass 
mobilization may reduce the labor depreciation cost of mass mobilization and thus 
facilitate further private conservation efforts. This is also in line with the argument 
that FFW may provide insurance and reduce the severity of cash constraints and thus 
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private discount rates.  We now formalize some of these basic ideas about crowding 
out and crowding in effects of FFW in some simple theoretical models. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
With this empirical backdrop firmly in mind, we now develop a simple model of 
household labor allocation.  We start with a static version of the model, which lets us 
focus tightly on the effects of FFW participation on household labor allocation to 
farming activities.  In the second subsection, we then generalize the framework to 
explore the dynamics of household welfare, land use patterns and investment in soil 
conservation.  In section IV, we then present findings from a bioeconomic simulation 
model that simplifies the general model developed in this section and places it in the 
specific northern Ethiopia context we have just described.    
 
a. A simple, static model 
We begin with a simple, static model of household choice in an environment of 
missing markets for labor and land.  While we are ultimately concerned with the long-
term effects of FFW on land use patterns, this parsimonious introduction underscores 
the importance of initial resource endowments when factor markets work imperfectly 
or not at all.  Assume that the household maximizes utility, where utility is a function 
of consumption (c) and leisure (Le).  
),),((),( FFWaFFWFFWaq LLTLwALqpULecUU −−+==     (1) 
where pq is the price of output produced (the consumption good is taken as the 
numéraire), )(•q is a production function that is concave in each argument, with the 
marginal returns to each input increasing in the other inputs, La is labor input in farm 
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production, A  is the land endowment3, FFWw  is the FFW wage rate, FFWL  is the 
amount of FFW labor supplied by the household, and T is the total time endowment.  
Because the model is static and the utility function satisfies the usual local non-
satiation assumption, the household consumes all its cash income (y). This model has 
no factor markets for land, only a market for FFW labor and a market for farm output.  
The two decision variables in the model are labor in agricultural production and labor 
in FFW. The first order conditions imply 
a
qFFW L
qp
cU
LeUww ∂
∂=∂∂
∂∂=≤
/
/*       (2) 
where w* is the household’s shadow wage rate, the marginal revenue product of labor 
in agriculture on the household’s farm.  The first order condition provides the 
selection mechanism that underpins household choice over whether or not it 
participates in the FFW program.  It participates only if the returns to farm work are 
as low as the FFW wage, in which case it will allocate labor so as to equalize the 
marginal returns to labor in agriculture and FFW (if access to FFW is unconstrained).   
If the household chooses to participate in the FFW program, it necessarily diverts 
labor away from on-farm activities.  Since output is monotonically increasing in La, 
average productivity per hectare cultivated or per person necessarily falls.    
 
b. A dynamic extension 
We now generalize the simple model above to account for the dynamics of investment 
in soil conservation structures.  This requires four key modifications to the static 
model of the previous subsection.  First, in the dynamic model the household no 
longer consumes all its income today so long as there is some prospect of being alive 
                                                 
3 One can equally think of A as the stock of quasi-fixed inputs, including not only land but also 
livestock and other productive farm assets.  
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tomorrow.  Instead, the household has to allocate current income between 
consumption and investment so as to equalize its marginal utility of consumption 
across periods.  Second, while in the static model, households will only devote labor 
to activities that generate current income, in a dynamic model; they might invest labor 
in activities that generate income only with a lag.  We therefore now break household 
agricultural labor into two distinct activities: field labor that generates income in the 
current period and conservation labor spent improving the land so as to increase 
future productivity and income.4  We model soil conservation investments this way 
because natural resources investments in African agriculture tend to be very labor-
intensive (Barrett et al., 2002). This leads directly to the third basic difference from 
the static model: effective land quantity is now a state variable.  The initial stock of 
land evolves in response to soil and water conservation investments and natural 
degradation due to erosion and nutrient depletion.  Farmers understand this and make 
labor allocation decisions accordingly.  Fourth, and similarly, the total stock of labor 
available to the household is now dynamically endogenous as well.  Future labor 
availability depends in part on current consumption of food (to maintain health and 
physical vigor) and of leisure (on current energy expenditure in work).  Households 
know that they cannot starve themselves today and devote all of their time to work – 
without any leisure/recovery time – else the short-term income and savings gains they 
enjoy will be overwhelmed by loss of future human capital due to illness, fatigue or 
even death.  
 
                                                 
4 One could equally understand land dynamics as depending on labor allocation through labor-intensive 
land clearing at the extensive margin (Reardon and Barrett, 2001).  In the Ethiopian context on which 
we focus in the empirical sections of this paper, however, soil and water conservation is the more 
germane link, so we focus on that interpretation for the remainder of the paper.  
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Assume the household’s utility is inter-temporally separable.  Then the household’s 
infinite period dynamic optimization problem can be represented by the following 
Bellman’s equation, in which β represents the household’s discount rate, Lc is the 
amount of labor allocated to constructing or maintaining soil conservation structures, 
δA and δT are endogenous depreciation rates for land and labor stocks, respectively, z 
is the stock of productive public goods, and I is net investment in conservation units: 
),(),(),( 11,,,, +++≡ ttttttLLLLec TAVLecUTAVMax tFFWtctatt β
 
 
           (3) 
 
 
We include the public good, z, because the typical justification for FFW programs is 
that they couple a short-term safety net for vulnerable subpopulations with investment 
in valuable public goods – roads, reforestation, irrigation, soil and water conservation 
structures – that increase future productivity.  The short-term safety net provides an 
income floor to insure against insufficient current consumption, thereby guarding 
against loss of household labor due to illness or injury associated with under-nutrition, 
through the δT human capital depreciation function.5  As modeled here, the public 
good may affect the rate of depreciation of land (e.g., through reforestation projects 
                                                 
5 In a more general specification, one might allow for the sale of quasi-fixed assets.  FFW could then  
reduce disinvestment in valuable productive assets, as commonly occurs in distress sales of land or 
livestock.  Since we treat land and livestock as non-tradable, we omit the distress sale mitigation effect 
from the present model.  Similarly, FFW could permit continued investment in other key assets, such as 
children’s education.  Given low school enrollment rates in rural Ethiopia, we likewise omit the 
possibility of educational investments and thus of FFW stemming the withdrawal of children from 
school during times of stress.  Finally, one could allow the discount rate, β, to be an endogenous 
function of current consumption (reflecting how survival probabilities vary with consumption levels), 
with the effect that FFW wage receipts limit households’ discounting of future consumption, thereby 
encouraging greater investment in conservation structures.  Although we omit them from the formal 
model in this section for reasons of parsimony, these phenomena nonetheless merit attention in 
empirical work. 
),(),),,(( 11 +++−−−+= ttFFWtctattFFWtFFWttatqt TAVLLLTLwzALqpU β
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that reduce erosion or feeder road construction projects that accelerate erosion6), the 
productivity of conservation labor in improving land quality (e.g., due to terracing or 
reforestation of public lands on hilltops that increases the productivity of private 
terracing down-slope), or direct agricultural productivity (e.g., through small-scale 
irrigation projects).7    
 
The laws of motion for the state variables A and T each depend on endogenous 
depreciation rates.  Land quality depreciates with increased harvests that extract more 
soil nutrients and with higher rates of erosion (part of the z vector), while land quality 
increases with time spent working on conservation structures and with public goods 
that stem erosion (e.g., reforestation or terracing).  The stock of labor available to the 
household is increasing in energy consumption (c) and decreasing in energy 
expenditure (equivalently, increasing in leisure, Le).  Given initial values A0 and T0 
and exogenous public goods stock z0, the household then solves the current value 
Hamiltonian associated with the above problem.   
 
This specification reveals the inherent ambiguity of FFW programs’ effect on land 
quality.  If the household chooses to participate, FFW program participation will 
reduce time allocated to both on-farm labor and leisure.  Because households 
rationally equalize the returns to field and conservation labor – the two forms of on-
farm labor we consider – so as to equalize the marginal utility of current and future 
consumption, FFW participation will induce a reduction in labor allocated to soil and 
water conservation, ceteris paribus. This can reduce land quality and hurt future 
                                                 
6 Ziegler and Giambelluca (1997) find in hilly, smallholder regions of northern Thailand that unpaved 
roads are, by far, the primary source of water runoff and erosion, having far greater adverse effects on 
soil loss and siltation of downstream irrigation than forest clearing due to shifting cultivation. 
7 One might also want to permit prices to be a function of z so as to capture the effect of road building 
or maintenance projects on marketing transactions costs.  We leave this extension for future work.   
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productivity.  Similarly, if the reduction in leisure due to FFW participation outweighs 
the increase in current consumption – as has been shown to happen in some FFW 
programs, where women especially have been known to increase energy expenditure 
by more than the marginal increase in energy intake they enjoy (Barrett et al., 
forthcoming) – then there may be some degradation of household labor capacity, and 
thus of future earnings potential.8   
 
These possible adverse effects may be dampened or even dwarfed by the potentially 
salutary effects of FFW on land quality through avoidance of lost labor time due to 
under-nutrition, through reduced pressure on the land due to reduced current 
cultivation (i.e., the crowding out of current field labor can reduce rates of soil 
nutrient harvest), and via investment in public goods, z, especially if the marginal 
returns to investment in soil conservation, ∂I/∂Lc, is increasing in z due to 
complementarities between public and private capital investment.  Whether the 
negative or positive land quality effects of FFW dominate will depend on local 
biophysical and economic environmental conditions and on the design of the FFW 
program, as Section IV illustrates through simulation modeling techniques.   
 
IV. Simulations with a dynamic bio-economic model 
The bio-economic model9 presented here is a dynamic, nonseparable household 
model that simultaneously integrates economic optimization in production and 
consumption with inter-temporal environmental feedbacks, allowing for nonlinearities 
in constraints as well as in the objective function. The model also incorporates risk 
                                                 
8 One sometimes hears claims that FFW programs also create dependency or retard innovative 
behaviour.  We know of no strong empirical evidence of such effects, however, and they fall outside 
the scope of the present modelling effort.  
9 A brief technical representation of the model is included in an appendix. 
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averse behavior through a constant partial relative risk aversion utility function, 
production risk due to drought10, and downside risk aversion to taking credit for 
fertilizer. Drought also affects prices for crops and livestock and price expectations 
and these have follow-on effects on household production and welfare. The model has 
been calibrated and aggregated to resemble observed patterns in a specific area of 
northern Ethiopian. However, household interactions through their participation in 
imperfect factor and output markets are characteristic for large parts of northern 
Ethiopia. We refer interested readers to Holden and Shiferaw (in press), Holden et al., 
(2003), and Holden et al. (forthcoming) for more details and applications of the bio-
economic model employed in this section.  
 
The model endogenizes land degradation due to soil erosion and nutrient depletion. 
The availability of biophysical data from conservation experiments in the study area 
allows us to estimate erosion rates as well as crop productivity responses on different 
soils. The model also integrates crop and livestock interactions. Crop choice, building 
or removal of conservation structures on different types of land, fertilizer use, and 
manure use are endogenous decisions that affect the rate of land degradation. These 
decisions affect soil erosion and nutrient depletion rates that, once again, determine 
crop productivity in later years. 
 
We want to assess the impact of new FFW programs in northern Ethiopia that aim to 
enhance food security through provision of seasonal employment at a low wage rate 
paid in kind, in the form of food.  In what follows, we study the impact of FFW under 
three distinct scenarios.  In the first, scenario (a), FFW employment is directed outside 
                                                 
10 The probability of drought in the model is assumed to be 0.1, see Holden and Shiferaw (in press) for 
more details on the impacts of drought. 
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agriculture.  In the second, scenario (b), FFW employment is provided for 
conservation investment within agriculture.  In the first two scenarios, we therefore 
distinguish between alternative sectoral allocations of FFW labor.  We assume that 
access to off-farm employment is constrained (i.e., households do not face infinitely 
elastic labor demand) and that conservation investment does not reduce initial yields. 
Scenario (c) is like scenario (b), but with unconstrained access to off-farm 
employment and with conservation investment reducing initial yields11.  Both these 
changes reduce incentives for farm production and conservation investment). In cases 
(b) and (c) we assume that the investment is taking place on the FFW participant 
households’ farms. In all cases the “wage rate” in FFW is 3 kg wheat per day of work, 
the standard rate used in FFW programs in Ethiopia.  
 
One oft-heard criticism is that FFW will undermine participants’ incentives to 
produce their own food and to take care of their own farms, partly because FFW 
activities compete for scarce time with households’ private farming activities. FFW 
advocates counter that FFW provided outside the main agricultural season stems such 
competition, enabling FFW investments and income to be largely additional to the 
household’s private earnings and investment patterns. However, FFW may still 
compete with households’ own conservation activities, as these activities are typically 
carried out in the slack agricultural season. In the site for which we developed this 
model, Andit Tid in northern Ethiopia, there are two growing seasons. It is most 
relevant to provide FFW after the short rains, that is in the period March to May, 
during which time households indeed undertake most of their soil and water 
conservation investments through labor intensive work on structures on-farm.  
                                                 
11 There is location-specific variation in terms of access to non-farm income and the short-term effects 
of conservation technologies on yields in northern Ethiopia (Holden and Shiferaw, in press; Holden et 
al., forthcoming) 
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In our first simulation (scenario (a)), we study the impact of FFW not used for 
conservation, when households have constrained access to the labor market12, and 
conservation technologies do not reduce initial yields13. We see from the eight graphs 
that comprise Figure 1 that over the whole ten year horizon we simulate, FFW 
increases income per capita compared to the base case model in which households 
lack access to FFW employment. We also see that own food production is reduced in 
normal as well as in drought years for households with access to FFW.  This occurs 
because households with access to FFW reduce farm labor use, including soil 
conservation labor. Reduced labor allocation to construction and maintenance of soil 
conservation structures means that a smaller proportion of the farm is conserved and 
total soil erosion increases among households with access to FFW. Scenario (a) thus 
demonstrates the clear costs of providing FFW in an environment and in a fashion in 
which it may reduce incentives for own food production and conservation, thereby 
undercutting future productivity and increasing the likelihood that participant 
households will need future assistance as well. 
 
In scenario (b), we only change the allocation of FFW labor, now assuming it to be 
applied to conservation on participating households’ farms, again under the twin 
assumptions of constrained labor market access and no initial yield reduction due to 
conservation investments. The results are presented in Figure 2. Household income 
per capita once again increases for FFW participant households.  But because FFW 
labor no longer crowds out on-farm conservation labor, FFW stimulates increased 
                                                 
12 This may imply a low opportunity cost of time outside the agricultural season. 
13 This implies that returns to conservation are fairly good. These two conditions imply that the private 
incentives for conservation are good. FFW, however, raises the opportunity cost of time during the 
period FFW is offered and this may crowd out private investment in conservation. 
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land conservation – as compared to scenario (a), where FFW leads to reduced land 
conservation – and thus leads to less soil erosion, although the long-term impact on 
household net food surplus is relatively modest. 
 
In scenario (c), we alter two of the initial assumptions in order to study the impact of 
FFW used for on-farm conservation when households have unconstrained access to 
the labor market (i.e., they enjoy better non-farm employment opportunities than 
previously assumed and thus have a higher opportunity cost of time) and conservation 
technologies reduce initial yields, thereby dampening private incentives to conserve 
land. Figure 3 reports the results of the scenario (c) model simulations.  
 
As always, household income per capita increases for households that choose to 
participate in the FFW program, because FFW represents an income transfer.  
However, the gains are less under scenario (c) than when access to the labor market 
was constrained because FFW no longer resolves a structural deficit in labor demand.  
FFW participation in an environment in which cash wage employment is available 
implies that the FFW payment (3 kg wheat per day) is higher than the cash wage 
prevailing on the local labor market. As a consequence, FFW substitutes for other off-
farm work, causing a reallocation of labor within the economy.  
 
On the other hand, FFW stimulates own food production and reduces food deficits in 
normal as well as drought years, and particularly so towards the end of the ten year 
period for which the models have been run. This arises largely because FFW is used 
for land conservation, which makes farm production more sustainable. Without FFW, 
households do not invest in conservation at all because conservation reduces initial 
yields and because they have alternative off-farm employment opportunities.  This 
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scenario illustrates how FFW can help poor households overcome borrowing 
constraints that restrict costly investment.  The food provided by FFW enables 
households to reallocate labor from current on-farm production without forcing them 
to make an excessive sacrifice in terms of current consumption.  Indeed, the corepoint 
of this paper is that these sorts of desirable crowding-in effects only emerge under 
particular combinations of FFW program design and the underlying biophysical and 
economic environment. 
 
The effects of FFW on food production and conservation of land can differ greatly 
depending on how and for what activities FFW is used, on the characteristics of the 
local labor market, and on the impact of conservation technologies on short-term 
yields.  In order to demonstrate this, we also run simulations with a reduced FFW 
wage rate. We found that households should choose to participate in FFW programs at 
wages as low as 1.1 kg wheat per day (down from the 3 kg/day baseline commonly 
used in Ethiopian FFW programs).14 The level of soil conservation investment was 
not reduced significantly when the wage was reduced from 3 kg to 2 kg wheat. If the 
main objective of long-term oriented FFW programs is to promote land conservation 
and the budget for this is limited, it would seem possible to expand total land 
conservation by reducing the FFW wage. This may also improve program targeting as 
more wealthy households would be inclined to opt out of the FFW program at lower 
wage, thereby allowing limited funds to reach more poor households.   
 
The land use effects of FFW projects have not been well studied.  The simulation 
results reported in this section underscore that when FFW competes with labor used 
                                                 
14 Barrett and Clay (2003) use survey-based willingness to participate data to elicit FFW labor supply 
curves in rural Ethiopia and similarly find a nontrivial population of households willing to participate at 
extremely low program wage rates. 
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for conservation, FFW may reduce incentives to conserve land, at least where such 
incentives exist without intervention. On the other hand, FFW may be used to 
stimulate conservation when there are insufficient incentives to conserve land, as in 
the case when initial yields fall with the construction of soil conservation structures. 
This illustrates that great care has to be taken in the design of such programs if they 
are to overcome private investment disincentive effects and not to crowd out private 
investment in soil conservation. Good knowledge about local farming systems, local 
market characteristics and prices, and the distribution of resources and welfare, are 
needed to avoid design failures. Lack of such knowledge by many past FFW program 
managers likely helps explain mixed past experience with such programs (Barrett et 
al., forthcoming). 
 
V. Discussion 
FFW projects have been implemented for short-term relief purposes as well as long-
term development purposes in Ethiopia and other low-income countries. There may 
be tradeoffs between the short-term assistance and long-term investment objectives of 
FFW (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2000). It may be that one can basically enjoy 
effective safety net effects that protect valuable human capital against irreversible 
damage due to temporary under-nutrition or one can enjoy productive public goods 
investments, but not both.  
 
In this paper we have focused on the potential of FFW to stimulate investment in 
public goods that may increase future productivity. We motivate the problem with 
household survey data from northern Ethiopia.  We then use a simple theoretical 
model to lay out the basic analytics of the ambiguous effects of FFW programs on 
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private investment in soil conservation measures.  Finally, we illustrate these results 
using an applied bioeconomic model for one specific area in northern Ethiopia.  Our 
results underscore that the success of FFW investments in stimulating soil 
conservation, sustainable agricultural productivity increases, and income growth 
depends crucially on several key conditioning factors, including careful identification 
of relevant investment projects (a process that typically requires substantive local 
participation) and of appropriate technology design, local involvement in 
implementation and maintenance of investments after the project, clear specification 
of property rights to the investments, implementation only where private capacity or 
willingness to invest are limited, and timing of projects to minimize labor crowding 
out effects. 
 
There are, unfortunately, many cases of past FFW projects that did not meet these 
requirements. For example, the top-down implementation of FFW conservation 
investments during the 1980s in Ethiopia typically did not involve local people in 
planning or organization. Farm households themselves had no real influence over the 
choice of conservation technology nor how it was fit into the landscape on their 
farms. This caused many to reject the technologies.  Many households partly or fully 
removed these structures from their farms (Shiferaw and Holden, 1998).  The NGOs 
that implement FFW projects typically are humanitarian agencies, many of which do 
not have the technical skills needed to undertake substantive investment projects right 
(although there are certainly wonderful examples of well-conceived and well-
executed projects).   
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For example, Smith and Little (2002, p.6) report on a serious bush encroachment 
problem in the Il Chamus areas of Baringo District.  The problem arises from the 
introduction of Prosopis spp. (mesquite in North America) as part of a mid-1980s 
FFW reforestation project intended to create fuel wood.  The problem is that Prosopis 
proliferates quickly, crowds out grasses, and is somewhat toxic for the small 
ruminants (goats, sheep) on which the Il Chamus agropastoralists depend.  The 
seedpods of the Prosopis closely resemble a variety of acacia pod, a common 
livestock feed, so keeping livestock away from Prosopis is difficult, but it hurts their 
teeth and gastrointestinal systems.  Locals deem the tree a serious nuisance and in 
their view the reforestation effort has actually reduced available grazing area and 
livestock productivity in the area over the long-term.  Smith and Little conclude that 
this project was "an unmitigated disaster for the [Ng'ambo] community and 
consequently they are now largely resistant to forestry interventions."   
 
By contrast, more recent FFW projects in Tigray seem to be better designed, and to 
involve local people more than many FFW projects in other parts of the Horn of 
Africa. Our analysis of data from 16 communities showed that the crowding in effects 
of FFW on investment in land conservation were stronger than the crowding out 
effects. FFW projects may enable farm households to become more forward-looking 
due to their insurance, liquidity and income effects, leading to longer-lasting benefits 
than are achieved through poorly targeted transfers.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
Market imperfections are a necessary but not sufficient condition to defend the use of 
FFW projects for short-term relief and/or for promotion of long-term development. 
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This paper combines empirical, theoretical, and simulation evidence to explore the 
conditions under which FFW can be effective in stimulating investment in soil 
conservation structures that are essential to sustainable agricultural productivity and 
income growth in rural Ethiopia.  Our focus is on the long-term effects of FFW 
projects because most FFW projects in Ethiopia have had long-term development, 
rather than short-term relief, as their primary goal.  
 
FFW induced investments may prove socially beneficial where private investments 
are below socially optimal investment levels. This may occur due to the public good 
nature of the investments (e.g. infrastructure), poverty and liquidity constraints, risk 
(e.g. tenure insecurity) and intertemporal market imperfections, lack of technical 
skills and the need for collective action to coordinate investments across farms. FFW 
projects may provide insurance and relax cash constraints, thereby lowering the 
discount rates of poor people and making them more forward looking and more able 
and willing to invest.  But careful identification of investment projects is crucial for 
the success of FFW investment projects. Local involvement in the identification, 
implementation, and maintenance of the FFW public good investments is very 
important if de novo FFW investment is to prove durable and if it is not to crowd out 
private investment.  
  
This paper has focused on how best to minimize crowding out effects and to 
maximize crowding in effects on private investment in soil conservation.  There seem 
to be several key, basic rules of thumb one ought to follow.  First, FFW investments 
need to be timed so as to minimize competition with other constructive activities, i.e., 
when the opportunity cost of labor is low for the poor households who are the primary 
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intended beneficiaries of the long-term investments.  Second, if FFW projects can 
protect human capital in the face of idiosyncratic (e.g., farm-specific yield) shocks, 
then its short and long-term productivity may be enhanced. Likewise, if FFW projects 
can enhance land productivity through investment in conservation and more 
productive activities, like planting of perennials, this will also increase the future 
returns to labor and other inputs and therefore also stimulate their use.  
 
As we illustrated with simulations from a farm-level bioeconomic model and with 
empirical findings from Tigray in northern Ethiopia, FFW can crowd in private 
investments in soil conservation and improve the welfare of people in the longer term. 
It is, however, a skill and knowledge-demanding task to design and implement 
efficient FFW programs. There is considerable room for improvement of existing 
programs. 
 
Appendix. 
Bioeconomic Model: Detailed model description  
 
Representative households (for household groups) are assumed to maximize welfare; 
∑∫ == T ttT tt udtuU   0    0  ρρ            (A1) 
through a time-separable utility function over the time horizon T. Utility in period t is 
discounted by the discount factor, ρt = 
t



+ δ1
1 , where δ is the utility discount rate. 
 30
Utility in period t is represented by a constant partial relative risk aversion utility 
function15; 
( ) 11 1 −+−= − µµ µtt Yu                   (A2) 
where  µ  is the partial relative risk aversion or the absolute value of the elasticity of 
marginal utility of certainty equivalent full income, Yt, which is equal to; 
( ) tttt IEY 21 ψψ −−=         (A3) 
where ( )tIE  is expected normalized full income in period t, t1ψ is a downside risk 
premium related to obtaining formal credit and t2ψ is a risk premium related to 
drought risk in the belg season. Full income was normalized by the poverty line full 
income ( )tγ , while the risk premia were normalized by the poverty line income ( )tζ 16, 
excluding the value of leisure; 
( ) ( ) ttt yEIE γ/=                    (A4) 
where ( )tyE  is the expected full income17 in Ethiopian Birr in period t. Subsistence 
leisure,  Lemin , is valued at the minimum wage rate, wγt, required for the work force of 
the household, taking out only the subsistence level of leisure, to generate an income 
exactly equal to the poverty line income;  
wγt = tζ /Lmax                    (A5) 
where Lmax is the maximum time available for work and tζ is the poverty line income 
excluding the value of leisure. The time endowment, Ft, of the household may then be 
formulated as follows; 
                                                 
15This type of utility function has been used by Binswanger (1981) and others in empirical studies of 
risk preferences of farm households. Its simple form makes it attractive also for modelling purposes as 
risk aversion is captured by a single parameter. 
16 Based on Dercon and Krishnan (1996) who develop consumption-based poverty lines for rural 
Ethiopia, including the study area. The poverty line is therefore treated as exogenous in the model. 
17 Computed based on probabilities of drought, hailstorm/frost damage and expected prices.  
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Ft = Lemin + Lmax                     (A6) 
and poverty line full income is; 
ttt Fwγγ =                     (A7) 
This formulation gives utility equal to zero if the household has Yt = 1, negative utility 
if Yt is below the poverty line (Yt < 1), and positive utility if Yt > 1. Population growth 
affects the time endowment and poverty line income causing both to grow 
proportionally over time.  
Market characteristics 
The model incorporates the following market characteristics. We leave out the 
subscript for year to simplify notation. 
• Credit market  
Formal credit in kind (for fertilizer) that is constrained from above (equation A8); 
fff CCFep ≤=         (A8)  
This credit must be repaid after harvest. It may also be possible to obtain informal 
credit within the village at a higher rate of interest (equation A9); 
ii CC ≤          (A9) 
This credit must also be paid back within the same year. 
• Labor market 
Households are assumed to have constrained access to off-farm employment and the 
wage rate in the labor market varies across seasons. Households may also hire labor 
for work on the farm. A price band is introduced such that the wage rate for hiring 
labor is about 10-20% higher than the wage rate obtained while working off farm. The 
household shadow wage in season p, *pw , should fall between the buying wage and 
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the selling wage when households do not participate in the labor market (equation 
A10).  
bppsp www ≤≤ *         (A10) 
Households may sell labor in some seasons and buy labor in other seasons, however. 
The households are assumed to be drudgery averse (Chayanov, 1966; Nakajima, 
1986). This implies that the shadow wage rate is an increasing function of the time 
worked and that there is a trade-off between income and leisure. Indifference curves 
between income and leisure will be upward sloping and convex in labor and income 
space. Household preferences for leisure in income-labor space are formulated as a 
reservation wage curve that is convex and upward sloping and calibrated to fit the 
observed seasonal labor supply/leisure demand and wage rates in the area; 
2
4321
* )( ββββ −++= ppp DDw  
WLD pp /
*=            
pp LL ≤*  
pFFWpOpHpFp LLLLL ++−=*       (A11) 
pLpCpF LLL +=  
pEppT LLL += *  
where β s are parameters, Dp is the seasonal family labor divided by the household 
labor force (W),  pL is the maximum time which is available for work
18, pCL  is 
seasonal family labor in crop production, pLL  is seasonal family labor in livestock 
production, pOL  is seasonal off-farm family labor, pFFWL  is seasonal FFW labor, 
*
pL  
is total seasonal family labor, pFL  is total seasonal on farm labor and pHL  is hired 
labor, pTL  is the total seasonal time endowment, and pEL  is the seasonal leisure time. 
Labor for conservation (building of new structures, maintenance of structures, and 
                                                 
18Maximum time available for farm work is determined by subtracting religious holidays from the total 
number of days in the period.  Work on the farm is not permitted on religious holidays. 
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removal of old structures) is included in pCL  unless it is carried out through FFW. 
The shadow wage is determined by the intersection of the wage equation with the 
labor constraint.  
• Land market 
There is an informal rental market for land in the area. This market is interlinked with 
the output market as the rent is paid in the form of a share of the output (share 
tenancy).  
• Oxen rental market 
There is an imperfect market for oxen renting in the model. Imperfections are due to 
moral hazard problems and seasonal timing constraints. 
• Seed market 
It is assumed that markets for seed function well but a price band is included making 
the price of purchased seeds 5% higher than the selling price. Households also have 
the option of storing seeds from their own harvest for the next season. 
• Output markets 
Output markets are assumed to function well but a price band is included such that the 
purchase price is assumed to be 5% higher than the selling price. 
 
Land degradation and conservation 
The main forms of land degradation in the model are soil erosion and nutrient 
depletion. Plot level soil erosion per unit of land (sea) is a function of soil type, soil 
depth and slope (land type class, A), rainfall ( rψ ), crop choice (Cr), and use of 
conservation technology )(Ψ ; 
),,,( Ψ= CrAsese rqAq ψ        (A12) 
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Soil erosion rates were determined based on field experiments carried out by the in 
the study area (Shiferaw and Holden, 2001). Farmers may influence soil erosion rates 
through their crop choice/land use or by building or removing conservation 
technologies on the different types of land. The model implicitly evaluates the 
profitability of erosion control on the different types of land (soil type depth and land 
slope). Soil erosion affects soil depth  ( sd )  through a transition equation; 
ttt sesdsd τ−= −1         (A13) 
where τ  is a conversion factor.  
Nutrient depletion in the model focuses on nitrogen and phosphorous which are 
considered to be the main nutrients limiting crop production in the area. The balance 
or depletion per unit of land at the plot level depends on the land/soil type, the stock 
of nutrients in the soil, crop choice, conservation technology use, yield, application of 
fertilizer and manure, and the release of nutrients from the soil. Nutrients are also lost 
through eroded soil and this soil is richer in nutrients than the soil remaining behind19. 
Release of nitrogen from the soil is assumed to depend on the stock of nitrogen20. The 
change in N stock is given by; 
)())((1 ttttt seseNNN ηηϕ −−−=+       (A14) 
where N is nitrogen, ϕ is the share of nitrogen mineralized in each period and η  is the 
nitrogen composition of the soil. The change in plant available N from period to 
period )(φ due to nutrient depletion is computed as; 
)( 1−−= tt NNϕφ         (A15) 
The reduction in plant available nitrogen is included in the production function 
(equation A17 below). The nutrients in animal manure are released over two years 
                                                 
19An enrichment factor of 2 is used for nitrogen. 
20We assume that 1% of the nitrogen stock is released each year. 
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with 60% being released in the first year and the rest in the following year. The 
effects of nitrogen and rooting depth depletion on yields are therefore included.  
Households may decide to conserve their land by introducing conservation structures 
(graded soil/stone bunds). Only labor is needed as an input for this, 100-120 working 
days per ha, depending on the slope of the land. Maintenance of the structures 
requires an additional 15-20 working days per year and ha. Shiferaw and Holden 
(1998) found, based on econometric analysis of plot level data collected in 1994, that 
poor and land-scarce households were more likely to dismantle conservation 
structures introduced through food-for-work in the early 1980s. Therefore, in our 
model households may also decide to remove conservation structures and this is 
estimated to take only 25% of the time required for construction. The conservation 
structures may occupy some productive land; therefore reducing the effective 
cropping area and this may reduce initial crop yields. Two formulations of the model 
are used here; a) where the yield loss is negligible, and b) where initial yields are 
reduced by 5-10% depending on the slope of the land. Building or removing 
conservation structures may therefore affect long-term as well as short-term yields. 
The long-term effect goes through the impact on land degradation and the feedback 
through crop yields. 
Crop production 
Yields of different crops are functions of soil type, soil depth, slope, application of 
fertilizer and manure converted into nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P), and 
conservation technology )(Ψ . The intercept of the yield (yiint) function, suppressing 
the crop type and year, is a function of soil type (Aq) and soil depth (sd); 
yiin t = yi(A q , sd)        (A16) 
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The impact of soil depth on crop yield intercepts was estimated econometrically using 
farm level experimental data from the study area and testing alternative functional 
forms21. The final yields, including inputs, were also estimated econometrically22; 
),,,( ,int FFAq PNyiyiyi φΨ=       (A17) 
where NF is fertilizer and manure nitrogen added φ is the change in available 
mineralized nitrogen, and PF is phosphorus added through fertilizers and manure. 
Yields may be influenced by conservation technologies )(Ψ  as conservation 
structures take up some part of the land, the structures may harbor pests, they may 
reduce runoff and leaching and, of course, erosion. The short term effect on yields of 
the use of conservation technologies is therefore ambiguous but over time yields 
under conservation should decline less rapidly than without conservation.  
Crop choice will depend on the profitability (prices and yields), food, fodder, security, 
labour demand and distribution, the suitability of the different types of land, and 
access to inputs such as traction power, fertiliser and property rights or rental 
arrangements for land. The crops grown in the area include barley, wheat, field pea, 
horse bean, lentils and linseed. Land may also be planted with eucalyptus trees, grass 
or left fallow. All the crops may be grown in the meher season but only barley, field 
pea and lentils are grown in the belg season. 
The model also contains livestock activities but we refer to Holden and Shiferaw (in 
press) for more details on this. Furthermore, the model contains annual full income 
and cash constraints.  
 
VII. References 
                                                 
21 See Shiferaw and Holden (2001) for details. 
22 Using data from FAO fertiliser demonstration plots for the Debre Berhan area, assessing alternative 
functional forms. 
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Table 1. Types of food-for-work activities in which households have participated  
FFW activities (% participation among surveyed  households) 
Dam construction 22 
Stone terrace construction 18 
Soil and water conservation 9 
Road construction 9 
Soil bund construction 6 
Tree planting 4 
Check dam construction 3 
Gully control 3 
Bench terraces construction 2 
School construction 2 
River diversion 1 
Other house construction 1 
 
Table 2: Types of mass mobilization activities during 1997 
Types of Activities    % Participated 
Conservation on communal land 47 
Conservation on private land 25 
Road construction 1 
Other work 10 
All activities 83 
 
Table 3: Types of assistance needed to reduce the land degradation problem  
Type of Assistance  Response % 
Technical assistance and labor mobilization 56 
Technical assistance 26 
Technical assistance and conflict resolution 15 
Technical assistance and other assistance 1 
Conflict resolution and labor mobilization 1 
Conflict resolution and other assistance 0 
Labor mobilization 1 
Other assistance 0 
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Table 4: Role of public and private conservation investments 
 
Public-led conservation investment  
Private investment Yes No 
                       Number plots with stone terraces 
Yes 173 174
No 527 650
                 Number plots with soil bunds 
Yes 106 68
No 594 756
    Intensity of stone terraces 
Yes 71.5 71.0
No 5.4 0.0
Intensity of soil bunds 
Yes 111.3 93.8
No 17.8 0.0
Intensity of conservation technologies is measured in meters on structure per ha of land. Yes and No in 
the rows indicate whether there are private investments or not on the plots, and similarly for public 
investments in the Yes and No columns. 
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Figure 1. The impact of introducing FFW when FFW is not used for conservation, labor 
market access is constrained and land conservation does not reduce initial yields 
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Figure 2. The impact of FFW when FFW is used for land conservation, labor market 
access is constrained and conservation does not reduce initial yields 
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Figure 3. Effects of FFW when conservation reduces initial yields and access to 
off-farm employment is unconstrained 
 

